Opinion | As nuclear tensions rise, are US defence plans for South Korea workable?

North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities threaten South Korea and the wider region. The United States has promised extended deterrence for South Korea to protect against these threats, and is resolutely opposed to South Korea developing its own nuclear capability.

America’s preferred approach is reflected in the nuclear consultative group it set up with South Korea last year, and its efforts to integrate South Korea’s significant conventional military powers with US nuclear operations under the so-called conventional-nuclear integration mechanism.

Besides the difficulty of bridging this capability gap, there is also the problem of how to coordinate the two countries’ strategic commands. South Korea is not content with the US approach, and would like more freedom to pursue its own defence initiatives. There are three options planners in South Korea would like to consider: developing indigenous nuclear capabilities, reintroducing US tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula, and/or building nuclear-powered submarines for the South Korean navy.

Unfortunately, the US has instead offered the nuclear consultative group, established in accordance with the Washington Declaration that came out of a summit between South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and US President Joe Biden on April 26 last year.

The group needs to become a firmly established and consistent mechanism. Ideally, it should be regulated like Nato’s nuclear sharing arrangements with the US, with framework and guideline agreements, and manuals detailing the standard operating procedures. Instead, the US-South Korea nuclear consultative group, which held its third meeting last month, has devolved from national security adviser-level to deputy defence minister-level.