Opinion | China’s engagement in the Arctic is part and parcel of being a global power

A report and interactive map from Harvard University’s Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, “Cutting Through Narratives on Chinese Arctic Investments”, published last month and co-authored by an international team of scholars argues that China’s presence in the Arctic has been exaggerated by numerous analysts and commentators. This much-needed breath of fresh air generated a healthy – if short-lived and industry- and geographically concentrated – rise in scepticism of the conventional but false narrative on China’s activities in the Arctic region.

The study points to a tendency to mix proposed investments with actual investments. It finds that the figures supporting these claims are inflated and include unsuccessful investment projects and proposals that have not been implemented. It cites Greenland as an example: despite Greenland emerging as the centre of debate about Chinese investments in the Arctic, much of the anxiety concerns what might happen rather than what has transpired.

Ever since China released a white paper in January 2018 that outlined its Arctic policy, the West has been seemingly obsessed with a supposed China threat to the Arctic. In the US Defence Department’s 2024 Arctic strategy document, the Pentagon seemed to drink this Kool-Aid. China was placed atop the department’s threat hierarchy for the region, likely elevated for ideological and budgetary rationalisations rather than as a result of objective strategic analysis.

Beijing’s Arctic interests and its growing collaboration with Moscow have been partly driven by the West’s isolation of the Kremlin since its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. That isolation forced Moscow to quickly pivot to Eurasia, where it has found new markets for its energy resources and oil products.