Opinion | Russia’s rare earth gamble is about killing 3 birds with 1 stone

The first target is Russia’s own vulnerability. For a nation that styles itself as a great power, its position in the global rare earth supply chain is embarrassingly weak. The US Geological Survey estimates that Russia sits on the world’s fifth-largest reserves, a massive 3.8 million tonnes of rare earth oxides. Russia’s Ministry of Natural Resources claims significantly higher figures, a reserve of 15 types of rare earth metals totalling 28.7 million tonnes.

Yet, it only produces about 2,500 tonnes annually, less than 1 per cent of global supply. Its entire production hinges on a single operation: the Lovozero mine on the Kola Peninsula, whose ore is processed at the Solikamsk magnesium plant in the Urals. This is a classic case of the resource curse for the technological age, owning the treasure but lacking the tools to unlock its full value.

Russia’s ambition to catapult itself into being a leading global producer is a direct assault on this paradox. The recent state-orchestrated takeover of the colossal Tomtor deposit – one of the world’s richest niobium and rare earth fields – by oil giant Rosneft signals the Kremlin’s intent to treat this as an urgent matter of national security.